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ABSTRACT 
In contemporary societies there is a growing need to coordinate and legitimize different perspectives. 
Instead of a dialogical search for consensus polarizing communication still prevails. The legitimacy of 
formal political institutions and conventional forms of political participation is in decline; increasingly 
publicly expressed people’s need for a greater influence on social developments reveals a deficit in 
approaches how to include them more actively in discussions on complex social problems. There has 
been a growing number of theoretical and empirical appeals to advance deliberation within 
governmental bodies and public institutions, as well as in a form of direct citizen involvement in 
(organized) face-to-face meetings. Yet, no radical shift has been made (so far), largely due to poor 
understanding of subjective and intersubjective (psychological) aspects of deliberation – the 
exploration of these aspects is the aim of this article. The case is being made for using till now 
unstudied influence of attachment style on the quality of deliberation and on the readiness to 
transform and coordinate attitudes with others in a deliberative process. 
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In pluralist fragmented societies there is a growing need to coordinate divided perspectives 
on issues of public concern in order to reach more legitimate solutions. The increase in 
information flow and communication channels, enabled by the advance in information and 
communication technologies, has not (yet) improved proportionally the quality of public 
discourse. The historically important role of rational argument and debate in the western 
public sphere instead of a dialogical search for consensus led to the prevalence of polarizing 
communication preventing efficient cooperation when seeking solutions to accumulated 
problems [1-3]. The legitimacy of formal political institutions and conventional forms of 
political participation is in decline [4-6]. Various authors have indeed pointed out the trends 
such as a withdrawal from public life into privatism, individualism [7, 8], the decline in social 
capital in terms of the reduction of organizational and associational ties outside the home and 
workplace [9], but at the same time, we almost daily witness the emergence of new movements, 
protests, strikes, networks and associations working towards community cooperation (the 
Arab Spring, 1000 Round Tables in Israel, protests in Greece and Spain, the Occupy 
Movement, Subversive forum Zagreb, Imagine Chicago, Imagine Nepal etc.). This points 
toward people’s need for a greater influence on social developments, revealing a deficit in 
approaches how to include people more actively in discussions on complex social problems. 
The theoretical, empirical and practical interest in participatory approaches, which promise to 
revitalize democracy, and improvement of the accountability, legitimacy and responsiveness 
of decision-making, has been growing rapidly in the West ever since the mid-1980s. There is 
increasing number of programs, organizations and initiatives undertaken with the aim to 
increase the quality of the public’s opinions or concrete political decisions through face-to-
face deliberation on pressing policy issues (among best known and established are 
Deliberative Polls, National Issues Forums, Citizens Juries, Study Circles, Planning Cells, 
Consensus Conferences, Scenario Workshops, and there are plenty other citizens’ panels, 
citizens’ summits, town meetings etc.). Many deliberations are also run via the Internet (for 
example convened by meetup.org, moveon.org, e-thepeople.org; and even software such as 
UnChat has been designed to facilitate deliberations). There has been a growing number of 
academic appeals to boost the significance of deliberation within governmental bodies and 
public institutions (i.e., as a feature of representative democracy), as well as in a form of 
direct citizen involvement in (organized) face-to-face meetings (see e.g. [10-16]). 
More than ten years ago, Dryzek [17] has announced the “deliberative turn” in the theoretical 
investigation of democracy. The significance of that concept is also reflected in an immense 
growth of empirical approaches to the study of deliberation during the last years (including 
the so-called empirical turn in studies of deliberative democracy). However, there is no 
consensus on the definition of deliberation, on how quality deliberation should look or how it 
should be measured. What is common, though, to all the existing, albeit heterogeneous, 
theoretical-empirical conceptualizations and practical applications of deliberation, is the 
understanding that it is a careful and respectful consideration of information and diverse 
points of view on the issue that affects diverse stakeholders and has relevance on societal 
level. Deliberation implies that actors listen to each other, reasonably justify their policy 
positions, show mutual respect and reflect upon and evaluate their interests and needs from 
the point of view of their generalizability [18]. 
The majority of the existing literature on democratic deliberation still has a philosophical 
orientation with an emphasis on the crucial role of rational argumentation and impartiality on 
the part of the participants. However, in line with more recent emphasis [19, 20] on the 
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necessity of moving from abstract ideals to conceptualizations considering human 
psychology, institutional frameworks, and patterns of social inequality, recent years have 
seen ever louder calls for a broader conceptualization of deliberation (also called dialogical or 
relational) which includes in the conceptualization and analysis of deliberative processes the 
emotional, identity, value and interpersonal aspects and alternative communication forms 
(e.g., story-telling, bargaining, rhetorics, humour, personal experiences sharing) [21-27]. 
For example, the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) [28, 29], presently the most elaborate 
approach to the analysis of deliberation in different spheres, originally derived from 
Habermas’ notion of discourse ethics, consists of the following deliberative standards: 
openness to participation, justification of assertions, consideration of the common good, 
respect for all participants, counterarguments and others’ demands, interactivity, constructive 
politics, authenticity or honesty (or type I deliberative standards) [28] and in the recent years 
also story-telling and bargaining (type II deliberative standards) [30, 31]. 
Even if we consider the socio-emotional and some other “irrational” discursive forms (e.g. 
self-interest) as deliberative, empirical research shows that participants in discussions do not 
function deliberatively most of the times [31]. The disillusionment regarding the 
implementation of well-argumented and just discourse in deliberative processes may, on the 
one hand, lead to the disillusion of the deliberative ideal; on the other, it calls for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the factors that foster or hinder deliberation. 
Research is especially lacking in the area of subjective and intersubjective (psychological) 
aspects, both in institutional contexts and in small-group public deliberations [20, 32]. As 
Elster [33; p.14], vividly argues: “theories of deliberative democracy mostly neglect 
elementary facts of human psychology.” Several authors [19, 20] have pointed out the 
absence of exploration on the influence of intersubjective orientations on deliberation quality, 
i.e. how participants in a deliberative process perceive other participants and how they 
interpret other participants’ 2 of themselves. Participants in deliberative processes have 
usually been classified only on the basis of their demographic characteristics and social 
background [34, 35]. 
Deliberation is enacted through discourse; the quality of deliberative outcomes thus varies 
with the discursive quality [36]. One of the criteria for assessing the success of deliberation is 
transformation of attitudes on the subject in question at the individual level and resulting 
convergence at the group level. This shift is far from being achieved very often [31, 37]. 
Factors that influence it are diverse and also under-researched so far [38, 39], as are 
psychological factors that affect the transformational potential of attitudes and readiness to 
harmonize own attitudes with those of others [40, 37]. 
Therefore, there have been quite some calls to investigate of individual, psychological factors 
stimulating or hindering deliberation, not only cognitive ones, but also personality [37], 
affective [41, 42], and motivational factors [43], and also interpersonal and group dynamics 
in deliberative processes [20, 32, 44]. Black et al. [39], giving the most exhaustive review of 
the existing methods of measuring various aspects of deliberative processes, expect “that 
future studies will refine considerably the measures”, especially regarding the psychological 
factors influencing quality of deliberation and outcomes of deliberative processes [39; p.4]. 
What follows in this article, is firstly a short overview of the existing findings about 
intrapersonal factors influencing deliberation. Secondly, argument is made for the influence 
of attachment styles on the quality of deliberation in terms of process and the outcomes – (the 
readiness for) transformation and coordination of attitudes with others in a deliberative 




decades, in recent years the attachment theory proved to be extraordinarily useful in 
enhancing the understanding of  individual differences in group-related performance [45, 46], 
and characteristics and transformational potentials of attitudes [47-49]. And finally, a 
proposal for empirical work is made. 
ATTITUDINAL AND PERSONALITY FACTORS INFLUENCING 
DELIBERATION 
By definition, deliberation requires from participants to be motivated to debate and to be 
informed about the topic under discussion (these are two items that are in themselves difficult 
to achieve in contemporary democracies). In addition, a number of psychological factors have 
influence on individual’s and group’s ability to deliberate well and (consequently) on their 
readiness to change their attitudes; these are not solely cognitive factors which received most 
attention so far [50], but primarily affective and personality factors. The emphasis on the 
latter is connected with acknowledging the significance of these factors for successful 
deliberation in recent years [41, 42]. 
Psychological factors influencing deliberation can be interpreted in two different ways: in 
dispositional terms implying that the observed ways of psychological functioning originate in 
the more or less permanent traits of people; and in functional terms, implying that cognitive 
and personality functioning depends, to a major degree, on situational factors – i.e., in a large 
proportion of people these characteristics are malleable to a significant degree [32]. There are 
good theoretical and empirical arguments on behalf of the functional approach. 
The existing research [37, 40] suggests that participants’ ideological bias has negative impact 
on deliberation and the likelihood of attitude change in general and changes in the direction 
of group convergence in particular, while certain personality traits have positive impact. In 
deliberations, liberal and conservative participants [51] usually move apart from one another 
attitudinally, with the former more strongly endorsing liberal beliefs and more clearly 
rejecting conservative ones, and vice versa. Ideologically moderate participants develop more 
favorable views of liberal beliefs when in predominantly liberal groups, and shift toward 
conservative view in relatively conservative groups [51]. Wojcieszak [52, 53] arrived at a 
similar conclusion, emphasizing that strong attitudes are very resistant to change and affect 
the ways in which people process messages, and consequently, their ways of deliberation. 
Furthermore, she argues that attitude strength is a multi-dimensional construct with many 
components, for example importance, intensity, certainty, extremity, which, in turn, exert 
differential effects in the context of deliberation. Especially attitude extremity and intensity 
which are emotionally based seem to present a hindrance for the reconsideration of biases [52]. 
As regards the personalities of deliberation participants, it has been shown that a move 
toward common ground or consensus is facilitated by relatively extraverted and conscientious 
groups respectively by open, expressive, careful participants [37]. Another relevant finding of 
this study is that the group-level shifts in opinion are related to self-reported deliberativeness, 
not to observer ratings [37]. It has also been shown that deliberativeness and readiness to 
transform and harmonize attitudes with those of other participants in deliberative forums are 
influenced by social value orientations (i.e., cooperation vs. competition and self-interest), 
high vs. low need for achieving a stable and secure knowledge (need for cognitive closure – 
i.e. consensus vs. dissent seekers), and a tendency to undertake complex and demanding 
cognitive tasks (need for cognition, i.e. persuasive and assertive vs. uncertain and ineffective 
citizens) [54]. 
The research studies on the psychological factors that influence the attitudes formation and 
personal ideologies are gaining currency outside the context of deliberative process research 
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as well [55, 56, 51, 57, 58]. One finding that should be highlighted is the substantial influence 
of (dispositional or/and situational) (in)security on human functioning. Generally, when 
people feel insecure, they tend to be more defensive, rigid, aggressive and sensitive to 
(perceived) emotional threats. Conversely, when people feel secure, they tend to be more 
open, flexible, pro-social and resilient. And there are more and more proofs showing that 
individuals’ attitudes move in one direction or another as a function of individuals’ sense of 
security or insecurity. At the same time, there are also proofs that situational factors that 
increase psychological security may override dispositional insecurity. 
DELIBERATION AND ATTACHMENT STYLES 
Until now, attachment styles have not been taken into account in theoretical-empirical studies 
of deliberation, although they seem to be highly relevant given their obvious and significant 
influence on the functioning of individuals within groups and on the shaping of ideologies 
and attitudes. 
Conceptually and methodologically, two approaches to attachment styles can be 
distinguished: the categorical which assigns each individual to one (pre-defined) attachment 
style, and the dimensional which measures individuals with regard to anxiety and avoidance. 
Individuals are then categorized on this basis (the categories’ names vary from one author to 
another). Measuring instruments are also diverse; researchers use either qualitative interviews 
that require complex qualitative interpretation or self-evaluation questionnaires. 
Generally speaking, attachment style is determined by the cumulative experience of 
attachment to important others in interpersonal relations, can be conceptualized as the 
combination of two basic continuous dimensions: avoidance and anxiety [59]. Persons 
scoring low in interpersonal anxiety and avoidance dimensions correspond to the secure style 
and are characterized by a history of reliable, predictable, and stable interactions with 
significant others, self-confidence, confidence in others’ availability and trustworthiness, and 
comfort with closeness. Persons with high levels of attachment anxiety in social interactions 
and interpersonal relationships compulsively desire closeness, have intense needs to be 
accepted, supported, and admired, and at the same time fear potential rejection. They view 
others as inconsistent and appraise themselves negatively. Their primary relational goal is to 
reach security. Persons scoring high on interpersonal attachment avoidance are 
uncomfortable with intimacy, self-disclosure, interdependence, closeness. They perceive 
others as untrustworthy, and view themselves as autonomous (avoid relationships, deny the 
need for closeness) or as undeserving of closeness with control over others as their primary 
relationship goal [60, 61]. 
The results from different national samples involving various population categories show that 
from approximately half to two thirds respondents at the most are securely attached [62]. This 
implies that we can expect that one third to one half of individuals in deliberative groups will 
be highly anxious and/or avoidant. 
Importantly, research evidence suggests that attachment styles tend to be rather stable from 
infancy to adulthood [63], nevertheless some authors see them more prone to change, 
especially with the individual’s conscious efforts such as through therapy and mindfulness 
[64]. Also across relationships, it has been shown that people hold multiple working models 
organised as a hierarchy [65]. A general, global model is most accessible and is applied when 
interacting with new people, whereas more specific models concerning types of relationship 




Attachment styles have recently begun to be studied in relation to groups as well. Group 
attachment styles were first postulated by Smith, Murphy and Coats [45]. Using their 
respondents’ most important social group, they showed that individuals’ attachment to group 
construct accurately predicts emotions concerning the group, time and activities shared with a 
group, social support, collective self-esteem and ways of resolving conflict in the context of a 
group. In line with Bowlby’s [67] notion about the generalization of attachment styles to new 
interactions and relationships, Rom and Mikulincer [46] showed that in functional, task-
oriented small groups interpersonal attachment anxiety contributes to the experience of group 
attachment anxiety, and interpersonal attachment avoidance contributes to the formation of 
group attachment avoidance. Given the proven high correlation between attachment styles in 
interpersonal and group contexts, we will measure only group attachment styles. 
More concretely, group attachment anxiety was, for example, characterized by a sense of 
being unworthy, vulnerable, helpless as a group member, by worries regarding acceptance by 
a group, appraisal of group interactions as a threat, negative emotional reaction toward them, 
lower appraisal of group-related self-efficacy. Group attachment avoidance was characterized 
by the appraisal of closeness to groups as unnecessary and the tendency to avoid dependence 
on groups or group interdependency. The higher the attachment avoidance, the lower the 
appraisal of group as a challenge, the higher the negative emotions that group elicits, the 
more negative the representation of other group members, and the higher the endorsement of 
distance/self-reliance goals [46]. In terms of individual’s contribution to group outcomes, 
attachment anxiety is associated with impaired instrumental functioning; and attachment 
avoidance with impaired socio-emotional functioning. Namely, anxiously attached persons’ 
hyperactivating strategies lead them to be more focused on maintaining the positive 
emotional tone of group interactions than on contributing to task completion. Because desire 
to be accepted and loved and desire to feel close to others, supported by them is their main 
preoccupation, they direct psychological resources mainly to the promotion of an atmosphere 
of acceptance and support among group members and the resolution of any intragroup 
conflict that could damage this atmosphere. As a result, these hyperactivating strategies draw 
resources away from task-oriented goals [46]. On the other hand, avoidant persons’ 
deactivating strategies foster a search for emotional and social distance which leads to a 
dismissal of the socio-emotional realm of group interactions and leads avoidant persons to 
invest time and energy in the completion of group tasks that do not require any emotional 
involvement with the group. Their contribution to the promotion of closeness and consensus 
among group members is poor; in their wish to distance themselves from the group they often 
even create overt conflicts with other group members [46]. 
As regards the links between (interpersonal) attachment styles and personal political 
ideologies (defined and measured as different covariates of unidimensional category – 
liberalism vs. conservatism), the majority of research evidence links secure attachment to 
liberalism or covariates of liberalism, and both insecure attachment styles to conservatism or 
covariates of conservatism. For example, Weber and Federico [47] demonstrated the 
connection between insecure attachment (avoidant or anxious-ambivalent) and right wing 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. 
Many research findings also point out that the readiness or the lack of readiness to change 
attitudes depends on a particular attachment dimension. For example, securely attached 
individuals exhibit greater curiosity and information-seeking; lower levels of cognitive 
closure, mental rigidity, and ethnic stereotyping [68]; greater openness toward outgroup 
members [69]; a reduced tendency toward worldview defense [70]. Anxious and avoidant 
attachment have been linked with covariates of (mental) conservatism, including preference 
for order and predictability, intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, and mental rigidity [68]; 
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severe judgments of social transgressions [70]; reliance on stable (and negative) stereotypes 
when evaluating outgroup members [68, 69]; and an unwillingness to interact with outgroup 
members [69]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Taking into account existing theoretical-empirical findings, it seems that (group) attachment 
styles are a theoretical and empirical construct that promises to reduce the lacking 
understanding of psychological factors influencing deliberation process. This construct seems 
especially valuable since it comprises intra-, interpersonal and group functioning; and at the 
same time cognitive and affective level. Attachment styles seem to be significantly and 
directly connected with the initial attitudes, and also with the transformation and convergence 
of attitudes in individuals and group as a whole in a deliberation process. Furthermore, they 
seem to influence significantly quality of deliberation of both individuals and groups. 
Therefore I propose that further research should test the relation between the levels of anxiety 
and avoidance in individuals and (deliberation) groups, and their attitudes at the beginning of 
the deliberation process, the changeability of these attitudes in terms of group convergence, 
and also the relation of these two attachment dimensions with meeting deliberative standards 
from the communication viewpoint. 
A deeper understanding of conditions potentially hindering successful deliberation would 
help developing more effective deliberation processes, strengthening deliberative competence 
of all (potential) actors in the public formal and informal public sphere and 
establishing/building trust in deliberation processes. 
This is particularly challenging in Slovenia as a post-transition country with a relatively short 
democratic tradition, a history of unique Yugoslav system of self-management (that turned 
into a kind of formal rituals that had no significance in the decision-making process), 
ideologically polarized (also due to the war and post-war trauma) and underdeveloped 
deliberative theory and practice. 
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SAŽETAK 
U suvremenim društvima rastuća je potreba koordiniranja i ozakonjenja različitih perspektiva. Umjesto dijaloške 
potrage za konsenzusom i nadalje prevladava polarizirajuća komunikacija. Legitimnost formalnih političkih 
institucija i konvencionalnih oblika političkog sudjelovanja je u opadanju; rastuće i javno iskazivane potrebe 




diskusije o kompleksnim društvenim problemima. Rastući je broj teorijskih i eksperimentalnih poziva za 
unaprijeđivanje promišljanja unutar vladinih tijela i institucija, kao i u obliku izravnog uključivanja građana na 
(organiziranim) izravnim skupovima. Ipak, (do sada) nije bilo radikalne promjene, većim dijelom zbog slabog 
razumijevanja subjektivnih i intersubjektivnih (psiholoških) vidova promišljanja. Istraživanje tih vidova cilj je 
ovog rada. Upotrijebljen je do sada nerazmatran utjecaj stila privrženosti na kvalitetu prosuđivanja i na 
spremnost za promjenu i koordiniranje stavova s drugima tijekom procesa prosuđivanja. 
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